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 “We see the cycle of hatred at work at every level of 
violence. It is a factor in intergroup violence. It stokes 
bias crimes. Perpetrators of domestic violence and 
sexual abuse were often victims themselves, who 
experienced as children the dehumanization they inflict 
in turn. Crimes of hate have a past; sadly, they have a 
future, too, as each contributes to the climate of 
demonization and the desire for revenge. Perpetrators 
become victims, victims avengers. The cycle extends 
across generations. It can appear to be almost a force of 
nature. There is a seemingly implacable logic to anger 
and vengeance that is barely interrupted by revulsion at 
violent death, by attempts at forgiveness, or by sheer 
exhaustion.”  
Nancy Rosenblum, “Introduction” to Memory, 
Law, and Repair1 
 
Cycles of violence are a reality in some situations and a threat in 
others. The “cycle of violence” (or of hatred, or vengeance) is also a powerful 
image invoked frequently in talking about the possible consequences of 
serious, especially violent, wrongdoing. It is a charged and frightening image 
but also an entirely familiar one that is a convention of popular entertainment 
from ancient tragedy to American Westerns, and to contemporary films like 
“In the Bedroom,” and “Mystic River.” It also emerges commonly as a 
looming threat in discussions of wrongdoing, resentment, vengeance, 
forgiveness, and reconciliation: wrongdoing begets resentment, rage, or 
hatred; feelings drive violent reprisal; reprisal in turn begets 
retaliation; and so on, driving the inexorable “cycle.” Conciliatory 
approaches to wrongdoing look desirable by comparison to the horrible 
prospect of retaliatory violence cycling out of control. It is because this 
can indeed happen that the threat must be taken seriously. 
Many discussions of child abuse, domestic battery, and school or 
gang violence use the idea of a cycle of violence.2 My primary concern, 
however, is the recurrence of this idea in contexts of political violence, 
where the cycle in question is one of successive rounds of retaliation 
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between two parties. I do not wish to deny the reality or the threat of 
cyclical violence in many actual situations, but I want to examine 
problematic and disturbing features of the use of the image of “the 
cycle of violence” in social and political connections. I believe that this 
image is misleading in suggesting that retaliatory violence - and so a 
self-propelling cycle or spiral of vengeance - is the natural or 
predictable outcome of serious or violent wrongdoing. I believe that 
this picture rests on a number of presuppositions about people’s 
responses to wrongful injury, including assumptions about what people 
are likely to feel when wronged, which feelings are likely to dominate 
their responses, and what those feelings are likely to spur them to 
seek and do. Some of these presuppositions do not seem descriptively 
accurate; they seem to overgeneralize or to neglect the significance of 
social and political context, as well as differences in moral and political 
conviction and personality, among individuals. 
Research and experience with restorative justice practice, for 
example, suggests that wrongfully harmed individuals are often willing 
to entertain forms of amends and satisfaction that are not violently 
retaliatory, and not always punitive, in nature. The upsurge of interest 
in reparations for mass violence or oppression also suggests the varied 
forms of satisfaction victims of injustice may seek, as well as deep 
differences in what those wronged will find acceptable as a response. 
Richer philosophical and practical understanding of negative reactive 
emotions like resentment and indignation, along with the study of 
victims’ reactions and responses in actual cases, reveals that those 
offended or injured may, individually or collectively, value explanation, 
reassurance, validation, apology, and amends from wrongdoers and 
communities, rather than seeking to inflict damage on perpetrators in 
retaliation. 
In addition to questionable assumptions about individual 
reactions, the presumed psychology of angry reprisal obscures the 
mediating roles of social and political environments in determining 
whether people receive instruction and incentive to engage in vengeful 
rather than peacemaking responses. People will seek satisfaction and 
vindication when they are wronged, or they will do so at least if they 
are not crushed into submission or paralyzed by terror. Yet what forms 
of satisfaction or vindication injured parties or successors will see as 
available and meaningful are significantly affected by the social and 
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political environment into which wrongdoing intrudes, or by the social 
and political climate that comes into being under the impact of 
oppression or political violence.3 Furthermore, assuming that 
retaliatory behavior is the default reaction to injustice or violence may 
also have the distorting effect of introducing a fictive moral 
equivalence between victims and perpetrators of violence or injustice 
in actual cases, implying that victims should be seen as capable of 
violence and ready to use violence or unjust measures to settle scores. 
The same assumption might in turn fortify a common and repugnant 
form of offender or oppressor denial based on the idea that those 
harmed want to get even, would like to repay their violators with 
something like the violence inflicted on them, and are waiting for their 
opportunity to turn the tables. In other words, they, the victims, are 
no better than we, the offenders, are in their willingness to act 
violently or inhumanely.  
Finally, the rhetoric of cycles of violence may have the power by 
means of its questionable presumptions to shift an unfair burden onto 
victims. To victims, it seems, falls the opportunity and the necessity of 
“stopping the cycle of violence” by adopting conciliatory rather than 
punitive, retributive, or unpleasantly demanding measures. One does 
not need to deny the importance of the possibility of igniting cycles of 
violence to see that those who have been wronged should not be faced 
with the dilemma: conciliation or spiraling violence, as if this were 
their only choice and solely their responsibility. This shifts to victims a 
burden of responsibility that is manifestly unfair if the assumptions 
underlying the “naturalness” of cyclical violence are questionable. 
Since one feature of serious wrongdoing is that victims incur “costs” - 
material, psychological, and moral - that can never be completely 
repaid by perpetrators or others (no wrong is ever truly undone), it is 
especially unjust to pressure victims to take a less demanding path 
than one that might get them some measures of redress and 
satisfaction. 
My point, then, is not to deny that there are cycles of violence. 
Nor am I arguing against the importance of retributive justice as one 
clear and indispensable form of vindication for victims and of the 
communal reiteration of standards. I want instead to make sure that 
the space is preserved in which we can ask questions about how cycles 
of violence are stoked or avoided, and what alternative responses, 
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retributive and non-retributive, satisfy victims’ needs for and rights to 
acknowledgment and vindication. My concern is that this space not be 
diminished or closed up by assumptions of the naturalness or 
inevitability of retaliatory violence, or the necessity or sufficiency of 
retribution as its surrogate. These assumptions can limit our view of 
what kinds of interventions are possible and necessary. I begin with a 
lurid, moving, frightening, and exciting story that activates the image 
of the cycle of violence in which the victim attempts revenge on 
someone who terribly and violently harmed her. I use this as an 
opening to ask what we think we see in the drama of vengeance, and 
what is less likely to attract our attention. This might help us to 
understand why we are so inclined to think that meeting violence with 
violence is the natural sequence, and that retaliation in kind has its 
own inexorable logic. 
I. Death and the Maiden 
A woman is at home in an isolated house by the sea. It is night, 
and she sits on the terrace. When a car turns in toward the house, the 
woman gets a gun. When she hears her husband’s voice, she puts the 
gun away - until later. This is the opening of Ariel Dorfman’s play 
about Paulina Salas, an imagined survivor of political violence by the 
former military government of her Latin American country. Under that 
regime she was kidnapped, secretly detained, repeatedly raped, and 
otherwise tortured.4 Paulina’s husband Gerardo Escobar is a 
distinguished lawyer; Paulina surmises correctly that her husband has 
agreed to head a truth commission that will investigate those - and 
only those - human rights violations that ended in death; those that 
are, as the play says “beyond repair.” Because Paulina survived her 
torture, her story will not be heard and her case will not be 
investigated. 
Gerardo, who had a flat tire on the highway returning home in a 
rainstorm, invites the stranger who drove him home to stay the night. 
Paulina believes this “good Samaritan” is the physician who presided 
over her torture and who raped her when she was kidnapped and held 
in detention by the state. Paulina believes she recognizes his voice and 
phrases, and when she gets closer, his scent. While Gerardo sleeps, 
Paulina takes Dr. Roberto Miranda captive, knocks him unconscious, 
binds him to a chair, mocks and humiliates him with sexual taunts, 
and proceeds to interrogate and terrorize him with threats of death if 
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he does not confess. Gerardo is horrified and terrified when he awakes 
to find Paulina holding Miranda at gunpoint. He cajoles, pleads, and 
remonstrates with her that her behavior is “crazy,” but she is not 
moved. In the middle of the play, Paulina tells Gerardo “what she 
wants.” She begins with the thought of doing to Miranda, in exact 
detail, everything that was done to her; she says that she wants to 
have him raped. But she concludes that what she really wants is for 
him to confess, in his own handwriting with his own signature, to 
everything he has done, so that she could keep the copy for her own 
protection and satisfaction. When Gerardo reminds her she might be 
making a mistaken identification, and so might be holding and 
tormenting an innocent man, Paulina replies at the end of the scene, 
“If he’s innocent? Then he’s really screwed.”5 
Gerardo tries to conspire with Miranda to produce a plausible 
enough confession to win his freedom; he feeds Roberto details of 
Paulina’s torture that he has wrested from her for this purpose. But 
Paulina is one step ahead. She has fed Gerardo small inaccuracies in 
order to see if Miranda will correct them; he does, and thus reveals 
himself as in fact her torturer. The penultimate scene ends in 
ambiguity, with an increasingly agitated Paulina threatening to kill an 
unrepentant and evasive Roberto. In a concluding scene Paulina and 
Gerardo are attending a concert of Shubert’s Death and the Maiden 
when Roberto appears to enter the theater. The Commission has done 
its work. For the first time, Paulina is again able to listen to Shubert’s 
piece, her favorite, that Dr. Miranda had played while he raped her. It 
is unclear whether Roberto is real or is an apparition of Paulina’s. She 
turns to look at him, then turns back to face the stage. 
Paulina Salas is a fiction, but her experience of violation and its 
political context is not. Dorfman, a Chilean citizen in exile during 
Pinochet’s rule, knows the facts of Pinochet’s brutal regime and the 
voices of its victims. Investigations of Pinochet’s rule by Chile’s 
National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation and its successor 
Reparation and Reconciliation Corporation found 3,197 cases of 
disappearance leading to extrajudicial execution or deaths under 
torture.6 Like the commission in Dorfman’s play, the Commission on 
Truth and Reconciliation was charged to investigate and document 
only the cases of victims who were killed or are presumed dead. So 
like the imagined Paulina Salas, the real surviving victims of torture in 
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Pinochet’s Chile had no opportunity to testify about their violation or to 
have their cases investigated, and numbers of those surviving torture 
were uncertain. The Chilean government recently commissioned a new 
investigation, and a report issued in 2004 reflected, at last, testimony 
of 35,000 torture survivors.7 
Since opening in Chile in 1991, Death and the Maiden has been 
performed in at least thirty countries in many productions; it has been 
made into a major motion picture starring Sigourney Weaver and Ben 
Kingsley.8 The play is morally disturbing and dramatically gripping. But 
what does the play depict as the reaction and reality of the victim? 
Dorfman’s Paulina is unstable, wounded, crazed, and vengeful, and it 
is her aggressive, threatening, and violent acts that drive the story. 
She has been confined, tormented, and violated; she in turn confines, 
torments, and violates her torturer, threatening him with death and 
shrugging off the possibility that he is an innocent man wrongly under 
suspicion. Paulina enacts the cycle of violence in its precise form; she 
not only needs and desires to inflict in return what she suffered at the 
hands of Dr. Miranda, but she seizes the first opportunity to act out 
her vengeful desires with startling ferocity. The scenario of Death and 
the Maiden embodies, up to a point, a stock plot and a popular genre: 
righteous retaliation turned on wrongdoers. “From the ancient Greeks 
to the evening news, every age has been transfixed by the spectacle of 
people driven to exact blood for blood,” says Jeremiah Creedon.9 Does 
this familiar and mesmerizing plot and favored motif of journalism 
capture some truth about the ways violence begets violence, and what 
victims need and want? 
Dorfman has said of the victims, “I am not their voice: I make a 
space for those voices, a bridge.”10 Some people who have suffered 
detention and torture like Paulina’s, however, do not see the reality of 
“the victim” or hear her voice in Dorfman’s play. Poet and human 
rights activist Alicia Partnoy, author of The Little School, stories based 
on months of secret detention and torture in Argentina in the 1970s, 
objects to the “thriller’s devices” in Dorfman’s play by which the victim 
of political torture becomes “a victimizer and a mad woman.” “[W]e 
hear a victim that is out of her mind and committing an act of violence 
totally out of context... Where is the acknowledgment to the stories 
and lives of all the women who did not need to resort to a gun and did 
not appear as - however justifiable - crazy as Paulina[?]”11 Partnoy 
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also notes the presence of disturbingly titillating details: Paulina, who 
has been raped and sexually tortured, is portrayed in both the play 
and the film versions as gagging Roberto by removing her underpants 
and stuffing them in Roberto’s mouth. Ana Roca, in an essay on the 
movie Death and the Maiden, observes as well that “the film 
manipulates viewers’ allegiances, making us doubt the victim herself 
to make the evening’s entertainment more suspenseful and exciting.”12 
No doubt Death and the Maiden is performed widely because its 
dramatic excitement draws attention to political realities from which 
people otherwise would rather turn away. Yet the depiction of the 
victim of disappearance and torture in the play and the film follows too 
well a stylized generic formula: the victim wants “payback,” and that 
means visiting on the offender equivalent violence or suffering, or 
vengeance compounded with interest. 
This tried and “true” - not to mention exciting - formula 
threatens to overwhelm the other important details that are worked 
into Dorfman’s drama. Paulina’s racing for a gun at the sound of a car 
reveals terror, not rage. Paulina has just learned that her “case” will 
not be investigated and her story will not be told as part of the official 
truth the new commission seeks. Paulina is suspended between the 
power Gerardo believes inheres in the legal system’s standards of 
proof and due process, a system that remains powerless to deliver 
justice to her, and the power to demand some satisfaction that Paulina 
has learned belongs to the person with the gun. Once Roberto is 
captive, Paulina first makes him listen to her story, before she insists 
on exacting a confession from him. Paulina recites a litany of violent 
reprisals that she has, to her own horror, imagined turning back on 
Roberto. Yet, in the end it is Roberto’s accountability, in a full and 
signed confession that admits everything he has done and so the 
confirms everything she and others have suffered and endured, that 
Paulina ultimately seeks. In the final moments of the penultimate 
scene, Paulina asks only for Roberto’s repentance as the price to spare 
his life; and she asks why it is always “people like me” - victims of 
violence - who are forced to make concessions in seeking a resolution 
to an episode or era of violence.13 
Paulina’s needs for validation, voice, and vindication go 
unanswered. The character of Paulina is not only a victim of horrible 
violence; she is a victim who is abandoned and isolated. Dorfman’s 
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play troubles us with the tension between a fantasy of vengeance that 
is dramatically exciting and the reality of victims who deserve and 
need some kind of justice in a world that typically offers them little or 
none. If Paulina is driven to a crazed vengeful rage, is this solely 
because of the terrible violence done to her by Roberto and others? Or 
is it also because, given that brutal, terrorizing, and humiliating 
violence, no other way has been available to reclaim her equilibrium, 
her safety, her dignity, and the recognition of her loss, pain, and 
blamelessness? Would Paulina be driven to act out that rage violently 
if there were other ways to claim what she needs, if her membership 
in a community entitled her to make these claims, and if it assured her 
that she would be respected and supported in pursuing them? There is 
no simple answer here, for there is no one thing victims of serious 
wrongdoing feel and want. Yet there is suggestive evidence that many 
victims face similar terrors, affronts, threats, and losses, and that 
victims are deeply sensitive to the ways provided or denied them in 
coming to terms with the wrongful harm others have done them. 
II. What do victims seek? Restorative Justice & 
Responses to Crime and Political Violence 
“In contrast to revenge, which is the natural, automatic 
reaction to transgression and which because of the 
irreversibility of the action process can be expected and 
even calculated, the act of forgiving can never be 
predicted...”14 
“If one person or group has wronged another, it is 
common for the victim, the injured party, to feel rage 
and resentment, leading to a desire to ‘get one’s own 
back,’ or ‘get even.’ ”15 
“Vengeance can thus set in motion a downward spiral of 
violence, or an unquenchable desire that traps people in 
cycles of revenge, recrimination, and escalation.”16 
“The victim then becomes the active perpetrator, often 
enjoying some of the destructiveness of the hatred. A 
cycle of retaliatory violence is set in motion. The victims 
and their friends take the shame and humiliation they 
have endured and turn it back on their ‘prey.’ ”17 
The image of the cycle of violence or vengeance implies that 
victims are strongly and perhaps naturally inclined to seek vengeance 
or retaliation in kind. How well grounded is this assumption in detailed 
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study of the responses of victims?18 What do we know about what 
victims in fact desire and seek? Several literatures give us insight into 
common, although by no means universal, patterns of feeling, need, 
and desire in those who suffer violence, humiliation, and indignity. 
Literatures exploring restorative justice practices, transitional justice 
and reparations, and trauma find common concerns and experiences 
of victims, while revealing the complexity we should expect in victims’ 
responses to being wronged and harmed. 
Restorative justice is a concept and a movement informing both 
alternatives to standard court processing and the “presumption of 
prison” for criminal offenders, and alternatives and adjuncts to 
criminal tribunals in cases of political violence and oppression.19 
Restorative justice embodies a view of crime or violence as a violation 
of people and relationships that entails an obligation to set things 
right; the emphasis is on acknowledging the needs of victims and 
requiring accountability, including truth-telling, apology, and 
restitution or compensation, from offenders. In the ordinary criminal 
context, restorative justice offers forms of conferencing and 
community involvement that allow participation by those most directly 
involved in a criminal offense; on the national and international plane, 
truth commissions and programs of reparation can be seen as 
embodying restorative justice principles. Restorative justice practices 
within criminal justice systems in several countries have now provided 
the basis for empirical studies. More impressionistic but intriguing 
evidence is available from projects of national transitions to peace and 
democracy. 
John Braithwaite, in his recent book Restorative Justice and 
Responsive Regulation, provides a concise overview of numerous 
recent empirical studies of perceptions and responses of crime victims 
and offenders in several countries to restorative justice programs that 
provide alternatives to criminal court proceedings.20 While many 
studies involve small samples and self-selection of participants, some 
more recent studies involve randomized assignments. To the extent 
that findings are comparable, significant convergence appears: victims 
with access to restorative programs (of varying design) appear to 
achieve greater satisfaction than with conventional criminal justice 
procedures by measures victims themselves identify as important, 
such as perceived procedural fairness, participation, and material and 
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emotional restoration. Braithwaite notes especially the work of Heather 
Strang, who overviewed empirical literatures to match what victims in 
Canberra, Australia, said they wanted with how well their desires were 
realized in either restorative justice or conventional criminal processes 
to which they were randomly assigned. In addition to diminishing 
feelings of anger, fear, and anxiety towards offenders, and enhancing 
feelings of dignity, self-respect, and self-confidence in victims, Strang 
found, in Braithwaite’s words, that “more than half of court-assigned 
violence victims said they would harm their offender if they had the 
chance, compared with only 7 percent of those assigned to restorative 
justice.”21 While these results are hardly decisive, they are suggestive 
in the context of a larger body of evidence. Almost all victims desire 
some forms of resolution and satisfaction, but victims may both be and 
feel well-served (“done justice”) by a process that is less punitive or 
vindictive but that offers participation, control, and a direct response 
from their offender.22 
Demands and responses of victims of mass violence and 
oppression in national and international contexts also suggests that 
victims seek and value forms of acknowledgment, reassurance, and 
reparation that are not exclusively or primarily retaliatory or punitive. 
Lyle Rexer, covering the gacaca proceedings in Rwanda for the New 
York Times, paints a striking picture of Rwandans participating in a 
customary system of local tribunals as a way to resolve the situations 
of tens of thousands of persons incarcerated for the 1994 genocide of 
Tutsi by Hutu in which an estimated 800,000 people died in a few 
months. The gacacas, local open-air hearings presided over by elders 
and community representatives, allow accusations, confessions, and 
defenses to be made and answered, and a communally endorsed 
resolution to be achieved. Rexer notes that “as the line of hundreds of 
villagers and prisoners snakes through the hills, leaving the trial site, 
there is a sense of orderliness despite the presence of only a handful 
of armed guards.”23 As they move into full operation, the gacaca 
courts continue to be controversial for questions of due process, for 
claims that witnesses are not secure from reprisal, for allegations that 
significant numbers of elected judges were themselves involved in the 
genocide, and for failure to address adequately the rapes estimated to 
have victimized as many as 250,000 women.24 Even amid the 
controversies, the unfolding of tens thousands of these traditional 
adjudications dramatizes how capable of restraint and decorum are 
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human beings who have suffered, and whose families and communities 
have been ravaged by, almost unimaginable violence. Rwandan 
gacacas, like Western-style court proceedings, restorative justice 
programs, or other traditional methods of community justice and 
peacemaking rely on victims’ willingness to forgo direct retaliation and 
to seek resolution through an orderly procedure that may avert, rather 
than insure, the chance to pay back the perpetrator in kind.25 
Leaders in national transitional movements for “truth and 
reconciliation” repeatedly express some wonder at the willingness of 
many victims and survivors of extreme violence and oppression to be 
moderate in their responses and demands. Jose Zalaquett, a member 
of Chile’s influential National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, 
reported after interviewing thousands of relatives of people killed or 
disappeared under the Pinochet regime, “Certainly, many of them 
asked for justice. Hardly anyone, however, showed a desire for 
vengeance. Most of them stressed that in the end, what really 
mattered to them was to know the truth, that the memory of their 
loved ones would not be denigrated or forgotten, and that such terrible 
things would never happen again.”26 South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission provoked legal challenges, ultimately 
unsuccessful, to its right to grant amnesty in return for full disclosure 
to those responsible for murders. No doubt, many South Africans 
wanted retributive justice for killers and torturers. Yet both those 
people and many others who accepted and participated in the 
Commission’s proceeding were actors in a peaceful political transition 
that avoided a “bloodbath,” in the term very commonly used, that 
many people thought inevitable just some years earlier. Participants in 
the TRC process that was a centerpiece of that peaceful transition echo 
Zalaquett’s remarks of some years earlier. Ellis Cose quotes deputy 
Chairperson of the TRC Alex Boraine who speaks of “the generosity of 
spirit of so many people who have been hurt so badly.”27 James 
Gibson’s recent impressive survey study of the aftermath of the TRC, 
found that while individual amnesty for truth is very widely perceived 
as unfair for terrible crimes, perceptions of unfairness are mitigated 
when other forms of justice - compensatory, procedural, and 
restorative justice, provided in some forms by the TRC - are offered to 
victims.28 Cose also says of his own impressionistic and moving study 
of victims of crime, political violence, and injustice, “I have repeatedly 
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found myself amazed at the capacity of and willingness of otherwise 
ordinary human beings to return injury with compassion.”29 
It is true that victims of violence sometimes crave vengeance. It 
is true that many victims desire and expect that wrongdoers will be 
made to “pay” through socially organized retributive responses.30 Yet, 
a substantial body of evidence, some controlled and some anecdotal or 
historical, shows that many victims seek forms of satisfaction, 
vindication, or resolution that are not vengeful even where they are 
retributive, or that are not only or necessarily retributive. Victims 
seeking retribution are willing to see an impersonal, measured, and 
socially sanctioned act of retribution as appropriate vindication in part 
because it represents a public and communally shared response rather 
than a private act of reprisal. Furthermore, retributive responses are 
not the only way to achieve a public and socially shared vindication. 
Victims do not typically seek, it seems, to visit back on their offenders 
what they have suffered themselves. For many victims of violence, this 
is more than an emotional fact; it is a moral position. In a stark 
statement of this position, Susan Brison, a survivor of sexual violence 
and attempted murder, says, “I have seen the face of a killer set on 
exterminating a fellow human being. It is not a face I want to see 
when I look in the mirror.”31 Pumla Gobodo-Madikezela, a psychologist 
on the staff of the South African TRC, goes so far as to speak of the 
victim’s resolve that “I cannot and will not return the evil you inflicted 
on me” not only as “the victim’s triumph,” but as “a kind of revenge.”32 
Yet the victim who forswears violent retaliation does not do so to inflict 
suffering on her wrongdoer, but to assert her own power to define 
herself as a worthy person, and as one who is not controlled or 
entrapped in reactive feelings propelled by another person’s deplorable 
behavior. 
It seems that victims of violence and wrongdoing have more 
complex needs and desires than the portrait of the enraged avenger 
can encompass. Many of these needs and desires have less to do with 
what the victim can do to the offender than what the victim wants the 
offender to do for him (explain, accept responsibility, show sorrow or 
shame, apologize, make amends), or what the victim wants to be able 
to do for herself (regain self-respect or moral equilibrium, or to trust, 
or to forgive). Martha Minow, who herself often refers to the potential 
cycle of violence, notes that in political contexts “Survivors differ 
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remarkably in their desires for revenge, for granting forgiveness, for 
remembering, and for moving on.”33 This is not surprising if we look 
more closely at the complexity of emotional reactions in play for those 
who suffer serious or violent wrong. 
III. What Do Victims Feel? 
Jeffrie Murphy, who has written extensively on vengeance, 
resentment, vindictiveness, and forgiveness, says that the “vindictive 
passions” of anger, resentment, and even hatred “are often occasioned 
when one has been deeply wronged by another.” He continues, “These 
are the passions that often prompt acts of vengeance or revenge, but 
one can have the passions without acting on them, just as one can feel 
sexual lust without acting on it.”34 Murphy does not imply that all 
victims are seized by the “vindictive passions” or that victims must, or 
are likely to, act on these feelings. What, then, are the links between 
suffering serious wrongdoing and angry feelings? Is anger the 
predictable or dominant response? How should we understand the 
nature of angry feelings prompted by wrongdoing? In particular, when 
victims of wrongdoing feel anger, at whom is it directed, and what 
forms of expression does it take? 
Those involved with assisting victims know that the range of 
emotions victims commonly experience includes “anger, fear, terror, 
frustration, confusion, guilt, self-blame, shame, humiliation, grief, and 
sorrow.”35 Ronnie Janoff-Bulman and Judith Herman in their studies of 
trauma, including the trauma of criminal and political victimization, 
concur. Janoff-Bulman says: “[O]ne might expect anger to be a 
primary response to human-induced victimizations. Anger is not wholly 
absent; many crime victims experience anger, rage, and an intense 
desire for revenge. Yet this response is complicated and often 
compromised by the victim’s self-questioning, which, perhaps 
surprisingly, may be particularly apt to follow human-induced 
victimizations.”36 Indeed, Janoff-Bulman cites research showing that 
the emotional responses of those who have been wrongfully harmed 
by others are more complex than are the responses of those who have 
encountered natural disasters. Howard Zehr offers us a window into 
this world of “the intense and contradictory feelings of victims” in his 
remarkable book of interviews, Transcending, in which Zehr asks 
victims of violent crime and families of those murdered to discuss their 
experiences.37 The sample is hardly representative, as Zehr’s interview 
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candidates were referred by victim services agencies and restorative 
justice programs. But the feelings described by those interviewed 
vividly illustrate the general picture given by psychologists of 
victimization and trauma. 
The thirty-nine victim statements include repeated references to 
“anger,” “anger and frustration,” “enormous anger,” “horrible anger,” 
“rage,” and “hatred.” Reported alongside the anger in many of the 
interviews are also shame, grief, distrust, humiliation, depression, self-
blame, shock, fear, and, in some unforgettable phrases, “shattering, 
howling pain,” and “visceral, animal anguish.”38 Victims repeatedly say 
“in the beginning...” when they describe what they feel; more than a 
narrative convention, this signals how important to victims is the 
succession and course of emotions that victims traverse in reacting to 
their experience, riding out the complex synergy and interaction of 
feelings, being ashamed of one’s fear, or frightened of one’s anger, or 
even, in a pattern too common to be dismissed, finding that grief or 
sadness over their own loss gives way to compassion for the 
offender.39 Many respondents describe intensely vengeful feelings, and 
only some of them repudiate those feelings; some report a 
psychological passage or a moral conviction that has caused them to 
overcome or leave behind vengeful feelings.40 
Given this complex and multi-hued tableau of victim reactions, it 
is remarkable how much philosophers and others have fixed on anger, 
resentment, and indignation as the paradigmatic response to being 
wronged. To be sure, there is plenty of anger in the responses of 
victims. Yet, too little has been said, in discussing the moral 
psychology of wrongdoing, about pain, anguish, grief, despair, fear, 
mistrust, shame, and humiliation. Neglect of the importance of 
“negative” emotions other than angry ones may limit our 
understanding of why, how, and when victimization prompts 
retaliatory violence, or does not do so. The frequency of these other 
emotional responses predicts that victims will value and seek 
reassurance, safety, recognition of suffering, and appropriate placing 
of blame, and are likely to want this from both offenders and others, 
whether or not victims desire or seek to retaliate or visit penalties on 
offenders. Securing these responses from others helps victims to 
restore trust and to nurture and sustain hope that their futures need 
not be endlessly and pointlessly blighted by the wrongs they have 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 5, (2006): pg. 81-105. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge) and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge) does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
15 
 
suffered and the tormenting or exhausting feelings they now must 
endure. 
Since angry reactions to victimization are very common ones, 
however, let us examine the ways angry reactions to wrongdoing have 
been understood. It is these emotional reactions that are thought 
naturally to prompt retaliatory action, or so the picture of a cycle of 
vengeance or violence has it. Common to many views in a long 
philosophical history is the idea that anger at wrongdoing (called either 
resentment or indignation or both indifferently) usefully prompts us to 
defend ourselves when we are treated ill and suffer injury, disregard, 
disrespect, or insult.41 I share the view that anger at wrongdoing is 
defensive. Yet, I believe we need a more capacious and complex 
account of what this distinctive kind of anger tries to defend, as well as 
what it is likely to dispose people to do, especially in a variety of 
circumstances and in the presence of other feelings. 
One fact we need to accommodate in understanding resentful 
and indignant feelings is how often human beings feel this way in 
response to behavior seen as simply “out of bounds,” as transgressing 
any of diverse kinds of social norms where the behavior neither harms 
nor appears directed at specific persons. While philosophers have 
focused on cruelty, injury, insult, wickedness, injustice, or moral 
offense as both the actual and proper occasions for these feelings, it is 
not hard to see that resentment or indignation actually occurs very 
widely, and in response to quite varied matters.42 Human beings can 
and do resent not only being wrongfully harmed, cheated, or treated 
with contemptuous disregard, but also behavior that simply offends a 
sense of propriety or good order. People often can and do resent what 
they believe is improper dress, undue familiarity, overconfidence, or 
behavior or treatment out of line with someone=s apparent social role 
or station; styles of dress, hair, or music they find alien or distracting; 
people’s standing too close or laughing too loud; and anything else 
about which there are thought to be normative boundaries, rules, or 
guidelines, things “to be done” and “not to be done.”43 
Resentment (and I would argue indignation as well, if these are 
distinct), while by no means necessarily a moral emotion, is 
necessarily a profoundly social one. It requires a sensibility that is 
attuned to norms that human beings jointly create and sustain as 
guides to shared life, and includes an inclination to take “personally” 
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the observance and transgression of the norms assumed in play. One 
takes them personally in being aroused by their violation, being ready 
to insist on their recognition if not their satisfaction, and being 
mobilized toward hostile, reproving, or rebuking expressions, including 
in some cases punitive behavior, when the importance or authority of 
norms is placed in question. Whether one is in a position to express 
anger, and to rebuke or punish, however, depends on a variety of 
features of context and social position, including how one stands with 
respect to norm violators and to others to whom one might look to 
share one’s perception and support one’s assumption of normative 
authority. People who smoulder with resentment or indignation may be 
afraid to express this directly to norm violators who are powerful or 
feared, or may wonder “who am I to make demands or raise a fuss?” 
when uncertain that others will share their perceptions or acknowledge 
their standing to challenge norm violators. 
A sensibility attuned to norms is a basic part of human social 
functioning.44 We navigate the human world around us by forming and 
acting on normative expectations of others and of ourselves. Our 
normative expectations embody what we expect of people, whether or 
not we expect that they are likely to behave compliantly (although in 
many instances we do expect that people will behave as they are 
supposed to behave). A normative expectation anticipates compliance 
more or less (and sometimes scarcely at all), but always implicitly 
embodies a demand for that form of behavior we think we’ve a right 
to. A simple explanation of that “right,” is the presumed authority of a 
norm of some kind; the expression of our sense of entitlement is our 
readiness to be aroused angrily at one whose noncompliant behavior 
threatens the authority of a norm we believe matters, by defying or 
rejecting it.45 
Resentment and indignation are this distinctive accusing and 
rebuking anger. This anger does not arise only when we ourselves are 
injured, nor only when the norms violated or the order threatened are 
moral in nature, however one defines ‘moral’.46 Even when we 
ourselves or others are injured or ill treated in morally wrongful ways, 
it is not the fact of harm or suffering in itself but the sense of 
wrongfulness of that harm or suffering that is embodied in these kinds 
of anger; resentment and indignation in these cases predicate shared 
moral rules, norms, or boundaries that define some actions as morally 
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unacceptable. These angry feelings are not only upsets or frustrations 
- as when one “blows up” over a persistent irritant, impediment, or 
discomfort; these feelings embody imputations of responsibility and 
fault assigned to other actors in virtue of their having transgressed 
normative - and in the most important cases, moral - boundaries. The 
essentially normative reference of these feelings explains certain of 
their important features. These feelings belong to that family of 
“reactive” attitudes which embody a “participant” stance toward other 
people.47 In that stance, we hold others responsible for their 
intentional actions, absent disqualifying or excusing circumstances, 
and see ourselves in a form of relationship to others that entails 
mutual accountability and the right to demand it. The occurrence of 
resentment or indignation signals that behavior is found faulty; the 
expression of these feelings constitutes a challenge to others and a 
demand on them. Because resentment and indignation express a 
finding of fault and a demand for some response it makes sense that 
they are not displayed in all instances, or not always visited directly 
upon the offending party. The fact that this anger accuses and rebukes 
someone means that to display it toward the offending person can be 
risky or is itself out of bounds in certain circumstances. Nor do these 
feelings, even when overtly displayed, characteristically lead to direct 
aggression against offenders, although they certainly can lead to that 
in some cases. 
I can resent something insulting you have said to me and take a 
poke at you. But I can also say, for example, “I resent that!” or “How 
dare you!” and thereby put you on notice that I have found fault with 
your behavior and hold you to account with a demand for some 
appropriate response. Appropriate responses from offenders include at 
the very least acknowledgment of fault and responsibility (when 
justification and excuse do not apply), and beyond that, some attempt 
at repair, including apology or amends. My resentful and indignant 
responses can also seek an audience in others who I assume will share 
my judgment of faulty action and will join me in or support my 
demand for an accounting. We might say, “Who do they think they 
are?” or “Are we going to let them get away with that?” These 
expressions verbally present the invitation to pursue an accounting 
that is demanded by anger focused on normatively banned behavior. 
So, one need not always or only demand this accounting directly of 
offenders; one can just as well turn its demands to an audience or 
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community, seeking shared or communal action. And whether 
individual or shared, an action that embodies anger at unacceptable 
behavior need not be violent, vengeful, or retaliatory, although it will 
be in some way confrontational or demanding. There are varied ways 
of pursuing a settling of accounts from offenders. Some involve doing 
something unpleasant to offending parties, but others involve trying to 
secure corrective responses from them. These courses of action do not 
exclude each other. One may seek both to penalize and to extract 
repentance or amends. 
Resentment and indignation arise as responses to behavior that 
contravenes normative expectations. Our central normative 
expectations include expectations of others with whom we think we 
are playing by rules not only to play by them, but also to rise to the 
reiteration and enforcement of those rules when some go out of 
bounds. Normative confirmation and enforcement is something we 
usually feel we have a right to expect of each other, alongside the 
behavior that specific rules require. When we express and direct our 
resentment or indignation at a norm violator, we demand some 
rectifying response from the one who is perceived as out of bounds; 
when we express our resentment to others, we invite confirmation 
from others that we have competently judged a normative violation 
and that others share our interest in affirming the norms we hold, in 
disapproving conduct out of bounds, and even perhaps in seeking 
redress of violations. All the more so when the violation is a serious 
one, a cause of harm, indignity, or insult that is apt to be seen as 
moral matter. 
If this analysis of the normative reference of resentment and 
indignation is plausible, it makes sense of the fact that the expression 
and aim of these angry feelings is not necessarily and perhaps is not 
typically violent, vengeful, or retaliatory. But victims of serious 
wrongdoing may indeed experience feelings of rage and frustration at 
hurt or loss, and these feelings can drive one possessed by them to 
lash out directly and strike back. One needs only to read victims’ 
accounts to hear reports of that rage and fury. Victims may also suffer 
humiliation that feeds not only anger but shame. Feelings of 
humiliation in particular deserve special attention, and have received it 
in some studies. Humiliation, an “enforced lowering of a person or 
group...that damages or strips away their pride, honor, or dignity,” 
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can be a potent and volatile source of rage that may seek to satisfy 
itself by achieving a kind of crushing triumph over those who have 
hurt and humiliated one.48 Thomas Scheff, for example, argues that 
case studies of warfare, duel, and feud illustrate that the relevant 
cycle of vengeance is “insult, humiliation, and revenge,” where anger 
is really a defense against shame, and “unacknowledged shame” 
drives retaliation and escalation.49 Scheff sees resentment as a 
“shame-anger variant,” but given the normative analysis of 
resentment I have suggested, it might make better sense to see 
resentment as disposing one to feeling devalued and shamed, if one’s 
angry reaction to injury is not met with confirmation and support by 
others, and also, perhaps, if one finds oneself feeling powerless to 
demand a corrective response. Actions can be humiliating even when 
they are not intended to be, but whether or not a victim of wrong 
suffers humiliation in being wronged, and whether the humiliating 
effect is intended by the wrongdoer or is not intended, there remains 
the possibility that the victim may yet be humiliated (or humiliated yet 
again) if the community or authority to whom the victim looks for 
normative confirmation fails to provide that validation. If the 
community or authority ignores the victim, challenges the victim=s 
credibility, treats the victim’s complaint as of little import, shelters or 
sides with the perpetrator of wrong, or worse, overtly or by implication 
blames the victim, the victim will feel abandoned and isolated. That 
abandonment is a “second injury” that can itself be humiliating.50 
Finally, whether or not that second wound is humiliating, it can 
precipitate anger, grief, fear, terror, or despair, the same 
commonplace feelings that victims are liable to experience due to the 
original injury or wrong. That is because to fail to confirm the victim’s 
sense of wrong is itself another wrong that violates the trust embodied 
in normative expectations, the trust that one can rely on a recognition 
of the shared “rules” by which we live. This complex dynamic of rage, 
resentment, indignation, and humiliation and the centrality of 
normative expectations to human social life sheds light on a 
phenomenon too common to be ignored. Whatever the particular 
emotional reactions and needs of victims, what seems especially 
painful and can feel disastrous for victims is normative abandonment. 
Victims of wrongful harm often experience as much or more rage, 
resentment, indignation, or humiliation in response to the failure of 
other people and institutions to come to their aid, acknowledge their 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Human Rights, Vol. 5, (2006): pg. 81-105. DOI. This article is © Taylor & Francis (Routledge) and permission has 
been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Taylor & Francis (Routledge) does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
Taylor & Francis (Routledge). 
20 
 
injury, reaffirm standards, place blame appropriately on wrongdoers, 
and offer some forms of solace, safety, and relief, as victims 
experience toward the original wrongdoer.51 It is bad enough to have 
normative expectations of minimal respect and decent treatment 
violated, to feel one has lost control of one’s life, or to be injured and 
rendered vulnerable to a storm of painful feelings. It can be 
unendurable then to be ignored, to be denied credibility, or to run up 
against the fact that others, including those institutionally empowered 
to deal with crime and violence, do not seem to care about one’s 
experience of violation and its consequences.52 
Given the need for normative confirmation, it is not surprising 
that retaliatory or vengeful responses by or on behalf of victims are 
not the only natural and appropriate responses to serious wrongdoing. 
Neither are these responses necessarily the most satisfying or effective 
ones in giving victims what they need and deserve. After decades of 
work with victims and criminal offenders Howard Zehr, a founding 
theorist and practitioner of restorative justice, believes that a “need 
for vindication is more basic and instinctual than the need for 
revenge,” and that revenge is “one among a number of ways that one 
can seek vindication.”53 Vindication includes others’ confirming the 
reality and the wrong of what has happened to the victim, 
acknowledging the victim’s loss, anger, and suffering in its usually 
complex and multiple forms, placing responsibility clearly upon the 
perpetrator and other responsible parties, and joining the victim in 
negative judgment, demands for accountability, and the search for 
corrective responses. It may be particularly satisfying to receive this 
vindication from the individual (or individuals) actually responsible for 
the harm, but what is essential is to receive this confirmation and 
vindication from others. What is corrosive for the victim, and it can be 
disastrous, is to be isolated or abandoned in one’s injury or sense of 
affront. 
Vengeful retaliatory action is one way victims may seek to 
achieve a sense of vindication, at least by placing responsibility on the 
perpetrator and demonstrating the victim’s anger in no uncertain 
terms. Socially sanctioned retribution may be preferred to private 
vengeance by some because it joins the victim with others and makes 
vindication a social and public fact, rather than a private satisfaction. 
Yet retributive actions are not the only ones that express solidarity 
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with victims, forcefully reiterate boundaries, and testify to the victim’s 
dignity, blamelessness, and membership in a community. Indeed, 
purely punitive actions might seem incomplete, or beside the point, for 
some victims. The vindication they seek might require the perpetrator 
or the community to respond to the crime and to them, rather than 
primarily to make the wrongdoer suffer. 
Art and science may be used to abet views that the anger of 
victims naturally or inevitably desires and seeks revenge. It might 
seem that the emotional appeal of revenge dramas, as old as 
literature, reveals the delight human beings can take in seeing a 
wrong “righted” by vengeful, and often by violent, means. The 
enjoyment of the dramatic formula, though, does not mean that 
vengeful comeuppance is usually sought by victims, nor that the 
satisfactions of the spectator to a drama of vengeance are a 
simulacrum of the enjoyment that awaits the victim who gets 
vengeance. The satisfactions of vengeance are often said to be shown 
by human beings’ fascination with fictional vengeance, but people are 
also mesmerized and thrilled by slasher and serial killer movies, 
excitement they would hardly feel were they to encounter a homicidal 
maniac.54 It may be enthralling to many people to follow a plot of 
perfect and conclusive repayment of ill with ill, but this enjoyment 
takes place for most from the safe position of spectators who are not 
for the most part coping with their own violation in the real world. 
Many victim testimonies suggest that the fantasy of vengeance is at 
some points powerfully satisfying for them. Even so, we have seen 
that many victims neither desire nor pursue retaliation or vengeance, 
and some will find even organized punishment hollow. 
Little is actually known about the satisfactions of vengeance, 
although some scientific research suggests that there are such 
satisfactions. Some breathless headlines in the press reporting these 
studies, however, turn out to be rather misleading. In “Payback Time: 
Why Revenge Tastes So Sweet,” the New York Times writer Benedict 
Carey reports evidence of “a biologically rooted sense of justice...that 
functions in the brain something like appetite.” “Retaliation,” 
“revenge,” and “punishing” are said to be functional and linked to 
brain activity indicating pleasure. But it seems that in fact quite varied 
vindicatory action can fulfill the “sense of justice” activated by others’ 
bad or nonreciprocal behavior: refusing to cooperate in a game, 
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putting someone in a shaming situation of accountability, signing a 
petition to protest a perceived injustice, or making a wisecrack.55 In 
“Revenge: The Evidence Mounts,” game players’ brains light up in a 
scan that reveals activity in a reward-processing area of the brain 
when players “punished” those who didn’t reciprocate their generosity 
in a money game.56 In “The Urge to Punish Cheats: It Isn’t Merely 
Vengeance,” Natalie Angier reports a study that shows participants 
eager to punish someone who “cheated” by not contributing fairly to a 
shared project.57 Aside from a curious eagerness to use these results 
in a general-interest publication to justify “vengeance” and “revenge,” 
these reports generalize from contexts of cooperative play where the 
“punishment” is usually refusal to make benefits available to someone 
who has not reciprocated. It is not so clear what they imply for 
responses to violence and serious threat, where there may be 
extensive and traumatic consequences of the violence suffered, severe 
differences in power and vulnerability between victims and 
perpetrators, as well as awareness of exposure to real risk in taking 
retaliatory (or perhaps even vindicatory) action.58 Nonetheless these 
studies are suggestive when one notices the expressive dimension of 
the tame maneuvers dramatically redescribed as “revenge”: human 
beings find it very important, even in a game, to express disapproval, 
to make known to free-riders and others who do not contribute to the 
maintenance of an order that they are under the disapproving, even 
angry eyes of others. These “punishments” and “retaliations,” 
however, are almost entirely symbolic. 
Human beings do feel pleasure, and relief, in making sure that 
they let others know that they are out of bounds, and human beings 
are often very sensitive to this kind of expressive correction. This is 
norm confirmation and enforcement at a very rudimentary but socially 
indispensable level. Confirmation and enforcement of more weighty 
and forceful kinds are needed in more serious cases, but the need to 
communicate forcefully that conduct is unacceptable is a constant. This 
is always a part of vindication, and resentment and indignation are in 
their very expression messages of disapproval that are confrontational, 
demanding, and at least mildly threatening. Some vindicatory value 
may be found by victims in the very display of their just anger, and in 
finding that others are willing to amplify its force by adding their own 
expressions of anger or outrage, and this might indeed be a source of 
pleasure and relief. None of this seems to suggest, however, that 
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“revenge” or “vengeance” in the usual, grander senses, are in our 
circuitry or our genes.59 
In sum, experts on criminal victimization, political violence, and 
trauma have explored the extensive network of fractures to a person’s 
basic assumptions and attitudes that occur when they encounter 
violent, threatening, and profoundly disrespectful behavior at others’ 
hands. These fractures result in the intricate and changing patterns of 
feeling to which victims of serious wrongdoing are subject. Vindication 
and satisfaction will be sought by victims who are not utterly crushed 
by powerlessness or despair. There are many levels and forms of 
vindication, and only some may be available for, and preferred or 
valued by, victims. Aside from roles played by variations of 
personality, disposition, and history of victims in shaping their 
attraction to or need for certain vindicatory responses, there is the 
crucial issue of what forms of vindication are available and are socially 
supported. One safe generalization that can be made about what 
victims want and seek is that they want and seek vindication in some 
form, and that abandonment and isolation in their injury is one fate 
that victims deeply need to avoid and deserve to be spared. 
Vindication involves confirming the fact of wrong and injury, 
identifying responsible parties, and responding to the needs of victims 
to recover or stabilize their sense of dignity and to receive recognition 
of their loss and suffering. This much is predictable. Vengeful or 
violent responses to wrongdoing are not. 
IV. Opportunism or Responsibility 
“Revolution! All masters, no slaves!” Graffito, 
Vondelpark entrance, Amsterdam, summer 2003. 
 “As I would not be a slave, so I would not be a master.” 
Abraham Lincoln 
Readers might now be impatient that I have dwelt at such 
length on the variety and complexity of responses of individual victims. 
After all, is not the “cycle of violence” most characteristic of rounds of 
retaliation between groups inflamed by a sense of grievance and 
victimization? I agree that it is, and it is precisely for this reason that I 
have focused attention on the individual victim’s predictably complex 
responses to victimization, especially victimization by violence. Victims 
individually do crave vindication, but may not always see an opening 
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to seek or demand it. There are many forms and aspects of 
vindication, not all equally available or relevant to individuals in very 
different circumstances. Social environments play decisive roles in 
attributing lesser or greater significance to the offense any victim has 
suffered, encouraging or discouraging specific interpretations of injury 
and expectations of responses to injury, and opening or closing 
avenues of socially supported and legitimated response for victims. 
Most significant for initiating or sustaining cycles of violence and 
vengeance is the socially supported idea that violence is both a 
necessary and justified response to a prior wrong, and sometimes 
even to a supposedly imminent one. The clearest examples of this are 
cultures that formally structure a pattern of “vendetta” or “feud,” and 
require members to enact vengeance on behalf of their families or 
clans, or to pay the price of social disgrace. Today, perhaps, the 
greater worry is a kind of “freelance” politics of vengeance that is open 
to opportunistic political leaders. While victims of individual violence 
and insult often find they are ignored, neglected, or blamed for what 
they have suffered, there are contexts where it is politically opportune 
for some who seek power to encourage others to understand their 
individual losses or suffering as a shared cause for violent reprisal, or 
to join in that shared cause even when they have not individually 
experienced harm. Retaliatory violence by individuals is in fact 
uncommon; it is very largely an orchestrated group phenomenon, and 
that is the most important feature of it to focus on for moral and 
political understanding. Groups can be mobilized around the elevation 
of an individual injury or affront to representative status (what “they” 
do to “us”), or by appeal to a history of violation or insult - real, 
exaggerated, or mythologized - that has gone unredressed, and has 
become a continuing humiliation that cries out for response. 
Of course, there are in fact many terrible wrongs to people and 
to peoples that have gone unanswered, and even unacknowledged. 
But whether the offense is real and accurately represented, or whether 
it is exaggerated, fantasized, or mythologized - or some of both - the 
common desire of victims for normative validation provides the 
switchpoint for socially shaped responses. Instead of talking about a 
cycle of violence as a force of nature or a law of human psychology, 
we should talk about the social reception and the political management 
of resentment, outrage, humiliation, shame, defeat or despair, which 
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involves both the power to frame events in ways that acknowledge or 
encourage these responses, and the power to direct these responses 
toward some kinds of expression and satisfaction rather than others. It 
is true that many in communities who experience protracted political 
violence, bombardment, siege, terrorist attacks, and persecution, in 
which individuals experience the injury, death, torture, rape, or 
humiliation of themselves or those around them, are likely to develop 
intense hatred, rage, and vengeful feelings.60 Yet these are precisely 
the circumstances of sustained group violence, and both the violence 
experienced and violent responses in retaliation occur through 
politically mobilized groups. 
The entrenchment of the idea of a cycle of violence can actually 
function, intentionally or unintentionally, as a part of the framing of 
wrongs and conflicts in ways that encourage retaliatory violence. First, 
and most obviously, to naturalize cycles of violence can mean 
mitigating, if not legitimating, the actions of those who respond to 
violence with retaliatory violence. There are also subtler possibilities. 
The assumption that violence and other serious abuses of human 
beings “cycles” reassures those who have in fact inflicted violence and 
visited oppressive or humiliating conditions on others that we really 
are all capable of this, or at least prone to it. This allows perpetrators 
to evade the significance and shamefulness of what they have done by 
imagining a fictive moral equivalence between perpetrators and actual 
victims. The available thought is: were they able to now (or perhaps 
had they been able to then), the victims would behave as brutally as 
we have; we are now being demonized, hounded, stigmatized, and the 
victims are opportunistically lording it over us.61 Since perpetrators of 
harm to others characteristically engage in some degree of denial and 
often in outright evasion, it is helpful to perpetrators to be able to level 
the moral playing field with the thought that “they are no better.” In 
fact, a classic study of perpetrator evasion in juvenile delinquents 
remains eerily accurate in application to today’s war criminals, masters 
of state terror, or participants in genocide: perpetrators predictably 
and repetitively use a few utterly common lines of evasion when faced 
with responsibility, and one of them is “condemning the condemners” 
– “they’re crooked too,” “they were asking for it,” “they started it,” 
“they would have done it to us if we hadn’t done it first.”62 
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The ugly falsehood of this moral leveling is further brought 
home when victims expressly decide that they will not engage in 
retaliation precisely because this is to be “like them,” like the ones 
who were capable of grossly harming others. The presumption that we 
are all capable of similar brutality can be used by perpetrators to 
distance or diminish responsibility. It can become a practical rationale 
for refusing to accept responsibility or even concede fault: to do so is 
to invite the inevitable bloody reprisal. Denial then appears as prudent 
or reasonable self-defense against an imminent turn of the wheel of 
retaliatory violence. At the same time, denial aggravates the due 
resentments of those already harmed, and can ignite more resentment 
or outrage in victims when the insult of denial is added to the original 
injury. Anticipation of retaliatory violence may even play a role in 
reasoning that it is necessary to escalate continuing violence, to insure 
that there is no one left standing to deliver the inevitable payback. It’s 
close kin to a way of thinking that Jonathan Glover has described as 
the “Hobbesian trap,” in which opposed groups each see a reason for 
striking the other first; fear of immanent attack is the tension in the 
spring.63 
At the same time as the picture of cycling violence allows 
perpetrators to deflect responsibility or can drive them to insure 
against reprisal, the same picture can pressure victims to go in the 
opposite direction. If the possibilities for addressing conflict are 
represented as “vengeance or forgiveness,” victims may feel, or may 
actually be, pressed to take an undemanding, or even a forgiving 
stance, even where this frustrates their needs for vindication or 
forecloses any of the varieties of vindication that might satisfy their 
needs to have their dignity restored, their suffering acknowledged, or 
their losses compensated. The pursuit of vindication will involve 
confronting wrongdoers with the task of taking responsibility or it will 
at any rate involve seeking social support for placing responsibility 
upon them; and vindication will usually require some other efforts to 
satisfy victims as well. The other efforts need not, however, involve 
seeking the satisfactions of retaliation or reprisal in kind or proportion. 
There is always the possibility, finally, that victims may feel pressed to 
forgo the vindication they need and deserve if satisfaction is 
mistakenly reduced to reprisal or revenge. They might drive their own 
resentment and right to satisfaction underground, adding the 
humiliation of knuckling under without vindication to demands that 
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they not irresponsibly make demands for justice that could trigger the 
cycle of violence.64 This is a prescription for frustration or unresolved 
anger, and either of these might later be mobilized politically in a 
quest to settle old scores. The century past has seen waves of 
“humiliation entrepreneurship” where the violence and indignity of past 
warfare and colonialism are deliberately recycled, leading to mass 
violence and genocide.65 
It is unimaginable, given the amount of violence there already is 
in the world, provoked and unprovoked, how much worse the world 
would be if in fact human beings were spontaneously and routinely 
prompted to counter-violence. Very often they are not. We do well to 
evade the dramatic pull of the image of the cycle of violence as a 
spontaneous, natural, or inevitable phenomenon. It misrepresents 
both the emotional realities of victims’ complex responses to violence 
and the importance of communal support and recognition of victims’ 
needs and rights. It is to the politics of vengeance and the politics of 
peacemaking that we should look in understanding and avoiding cycles 
of violent and vengeful retaliation. It is the social reception and the 
political management of resentment, outrage, humiliation, shame, 
defeat or despair in the wake of violence that will repay very careful 
study.66 
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discuss the torture. The victim reports, “We were both ashamed.” See 
Unspeakable Acts, Ordinary People (Berekely and Los Angeles: 
University of California, 2000): 172-177, quotation 176. While these 
cases are clearly unusual, there are also reports of astounding 
magnanimity, and even compassion, by torture victims toward those 
who perpetrated obscene and violent acts upon them. Lawrence 
Wechsler describes Luis Perez Aguirre, a young Jesuit priest repeatedly 
imprisoned and tortured in Uruguay, in 1981, who actively approached 
the man who tortured him with forgiveness. See Lawrence Wechsler, A 
Miracle, A Universe: Coming to Terms With Torturers 154-155. 
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40. An astonishing story of years of rage and bitterness resolved into 
compassion by a meeting between torturer and victim is Eric Lomax, 
The Railway Man: A POW’s Searing Account of War, Brutality and 
Forgiveness (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995), reprised in Aaron 
Lazare’s On Apology (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 242-
48. 
41. The idea that a person responds, not only naturally but properly, with 
anger, resentment, or indignation to another’s violence or disregard 
toward him or her, and perhaps toward others, has a long history in 
philosophy. One of the circumstances that makes anger appropriate, 
on Aristotle’s account of the virtue of “good temper,” is that in which 
oneself or one’s friends are insulted, and in which without anger one 
who suffers insult is “unlikely to defend himself.” Aristotle, 
Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Sir David Ross (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1980), 97, 1125b. The more modern views of Joseph Butler and 
Adam Smith see resentment or indignation (anger that rises toward a 
wrongdoer upon the perception of a wrong) as natural human 
responses that are proper to the extent that they prompt 
proportionate rebuke or punishment, and are objectionable only when 
excessive and vengeful. Joseph Butler, “Upon Resentment,” Butler’s 
Fifteen Sermons, edited and with an introduction by T. A. Roberts 
(London: SPCK, 1970), 79; Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments [1817] (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 1997), 86. 
The most widely cited recent accounts of resentment are those of 
Jeffrie Murphy and Jean Hampton in their joint Forgiveness and Mercy 
(New York: Cambridge, 1988); Murphy explains resentment as 
defending self-respect and Hampton as defending “one’s rank and 
value” in instances where one has been injured, exploited, or insulted. 
Although many contemporary philosophers make a distinction between 
resentment and indignation, I here treat “anger at wrongdoing” as 
encompassing both, if they are indeed distinct. Butler, Smith, and later 
John Stuart Mill, for example, treated the terms as interchangeable, 
and it goes too far afield into questions about the ontology of emotion 
and about emotion concepts to take up the issue here of whether 
‘resentment’ and ‘indignation’ pick out two distinct emotions. 
42. See the accounts of Butler, Smith, Murphy, and Hampton; also John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1971), 88. Others distinguish between resentment and 
indignation as the nonmoral and moral versions of anger respectively, 
or as anger at wrong to self and anger at wrong to others, 
respectively. P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” took the first 
position. R. J. Wallace argues against conceiving resentment as 
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necessarily a moral sentiment, in Responsibility and the Moral 
Sentiments (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1996), 248-
249. For my own argument that resentment can be premised upon 
norms of any type, and for the analysis of resentment upon which I 
draw here, see Margaret Urban Walker, “Resentment and Assurance,” 
in Setting the Moral Compass: Essays by Women Philosophers, ed. 
Cheshire Calhoun (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
43. It is also true that the assumed rules, boundaries, or proprieties that 
resentment rises to defend need not be morally acceptable ones. 
Members of a racially exclusive white club are apt to resent the 
suggestion that nonwhites should be admitted; many men in 
stereotypically masculine occupations, such as the military, can react 
with great hostility to women’s ”invasion” of their male and masculine 
spaces and roles. See my “Resentment and Assurance,” in Calhoun, 
Setting the Moral Compass for more on these morally objectionable 
resentments. 
44. It is not exclusively human, however, and this should not be surprising. 
See Frans De Waal on the “sense of social regularity” in primates, in 
Good Natured: the Origins of Right and Wrong in Humans and Other 
Animals (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 89-97. 
45. For a fuller account of reliance, trust, and normative expectations, see my 
“Damages to Trust,” forthcoming. 
46. In a famous discussion, P. F. Strawson saw reactive attitudes as reactions 
to “the quality of others’ wills,” and as expressing our demands for “a 
certain degree of goodwill or regard on the part of other human 
beings” toward ourselves or others; see Strawson, “Freedom and 
Resentment” in P. F. Strawson, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of 
Thought and Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 85. 
This view, however, is dominated by cases of resentment or 
indignation at injury; it fails to explain how widely resentment (and 
even indignation) occurs with respect to nonconforming behavior that 
harms no individuals and is directed at no individuals. What seems 
true, rather, is that behavior outside of normative boundaries can 
easily lead to suspicions or imputations of faulty attitude, that is, of 
contempt, hostility, or negligence, just as certain injuring or insulting 
actions are seen as immediate expressions of it. Again, see my 
“Resentment and Assurance,” in Calhoun, Setting the Moral Compass. 
47. The vocabulary is Strawson’s in “Freedom and Resentment,” see note 38 
preceding. Strawson distinguished reactive attitudes that address 
others’ behavior and self-reactive attitudes that are our responses to 
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our own. For my purposes here, I speak only about those other-
directed reactions. 
48. Evelin Lindner, “Healing the Cycles of Humiliation: How to Attend to the 
‘Humiliation Entrepreneurship’,” Peace and Conflict 8 (2002): 125-139, 
offers this description. 
49. Thomas J. Scheff, Bloody Revenge: Emotions, Nationalism and War 
(Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse.com, Inc., 2000), page 3-4. Janoff-
Bulman notes research that human-induced victimization is apt to be 
humiliating, having made one helpless or overwhelmed before another 
person, challenging the victim’s “competence and independence,” 
Janoff-Bulman, Shattered Assumptions, 80. James Gilligan, Violence: 
Reflections on a National Epidemic (New York: Vintage Books, 1997) 
argues more broadly that “The emotion of shame is the primary or 
ultimate cause of all violence, whether toward others or toward the 
self. Shame is a necessary but not a sufficient cause of 
violence...”,110. 
50. Janoff-Bulman cites Martin Symonds on the “second injury,” Shattered 
Assumptions, 147. See also Yael Danieli, “Introduction,” International 
Handbook of Multigenerational Legacies of Trauma (New York: Plenum 
Press,1998), 7, on the “second wound” and the “conspiracy of silence.” 
51. A blistering and unnervingly intense presentation of the sense of 
abandonment is Jean Amery’s expression of “Resentments” in his At 
the Mind’s Limits: Contemplations By a Survivor on Auschwitz and Its 
Realities, trans. Sidney Rosenfeld and Stella P. Rosenfeld (Bloomington 
and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1980. 
52. Thomas Brudholm explores three layers of violation involved in pressuring 
victims of political violence to take up a forgiving attitude to 
unpunished perpetrators, as he and others argue happened in the 
atmosphere of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 
there is the original violation, an amnesty policy that precludes legal 
redress for victims, and then a celebration of forgiveness that 
discouraged or implicitly criticized victims’ continuing resentment. See 
Thomas Brudholm, “ ‘An ugly intrusion’: Resentment in the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission of South Africa,” unpublished ms. 
53. Howard Zehr, Transcending, 191. 
54. Thomas Scheff, for example, mentions “the revenge genre in world 
literature” alongside literature describing actual vengeance and conflict 
as testifying to the importance of the revenge motive, in Bloody 
Revenge. Peter French begins his philosophical defense of the 
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necessity for vengeance with a lengthy discussion of the revenge plot 
in American Western movies in The Virtues of Vengeance (Lawrence, 
Kansas: The University Press of Kansas, 2001. 
55. Benedict Carey, “Payback Time: Why Revenge Tastes So Sweet”, New 
York Times, 7/27/04. 
56. New York Times, 8/31/04. 
57. New York Times, 01/22/02. 
58. Unless we disregard half the human population in discussing what 
reactions are “natural” to human beings, the extraordinary worldwide 
incidence of domestic and socially sanctioned violence against women 
constitutes a massive challenge to the idea the retaliation is a natural 
and predictable response to violent treatment. Although cases of 
women who kill their batterers are grist for sensational newspaper 
coverage and TV movies, the fact is that the great majority of women 
who experience domestic violence suffer under it or seek escape if 
they can no longer placate or endure their batterers. 
59. Robert Axelrod=s introduces the idea of “negative indirect reciprocity,” a 
metanorm that requires nonpunishers themselves to be punished in 
Axelrod, “An evolutionary approach to norms,” American Political 
Science Review 80 (1986): 1095-1111. This makes sense because we 
do look to each other and trust each other to accept the shared task of 
iterating and enforcing norms. But again, what we demand of each 
other is clear normative confirmation or vindication; this may or may 
not take the form of punishment in the usual sense. 
60. See Jodi Halpern and Harvey M. Weinstein, “Rehumanizing the Other: 
Empathy and Reconciliation,” Human Rights Quarterly 2 (2004): 561-
583, on the abilities needed to overcome this kind of entrenched 
hatred, and some sobering results of research into the aftermath of 
conflict in the Balkans. There are enormous social pressures felt by 
individuals, for example, not to interact and empathize with others of 
the enemy group. 
61. Antje Krog reports that a white woman comments during South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission hearings that she doesn’t watch 
“because all you see there is a sea of hatred,” although in fact the 
hearings are almost eerily free of violent or aggressive outbursts. Krog 
also quotes this observation from clinical psychologist Nomfundo 
Walaza: “ ‘That is pure projection,’ says Walaza. ‘Firstly, she knows 
instinctively that if apartheid had been done to her, she would have 
hated. And secondly, whites prefer to think they are being hated; then 
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they don’t need to change.’ ” Antje Krog, Country of My Skull: Guilt, 
Sorrow, and the Limits of Forgiveness in the New South Africa (New 
York: Times Books, 1999), 212. 
62. The study is G. Sykes and D. Matza, “Techniques in Neutralization: A 
Theory of Delinquency,” American Sociological Review 22 (1957): 664-
70, cited in John Braithwaite’s Restorative Justice and Responsive 
Regulation. The other forms are denial of the victim, denial of the 
injury, denial of responsibility, and appeal to higher loyalties. 
63. Jonathan Glover, Humanity: A Moral History of the 20th Century (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 131. 
64. Brandon Hamber notes that politicians sometimes urge accommodations 
in situations of conflict by pointing to the frightening possibility of a 
looming or continuing cycle of violence, when in fact those politicians 
have some degree of control over the violence that looms. Brandon 
Hamber, “Flying flags of fear: The role of fear in the process of political 
transition,” Working Paper of 13 September 2003, presented at the 
Risk, Complex Crises and Social Futures Conference, Amman, Jordan, 
11-13 October 2003. 
65. The phrase is from Evelin Lindner, “Healing the Cycles of Humiliation.” 
Lindner uses Adolph Hitler and the Hutu leadership in the 1994 
Rwandan genocide as examples. Ervin Staub, in “The Psychology of 
Bystanders, Perpetrators, and Heroic Helpers,” International Journal of 
Intercultural Relations 17 (1993): 315-341, includes ideological 
formations that cast some groups in the role of the enemy and a 
“shaky self-concept that requires self-defense”(320) among factors 
that dispose a group toward mass killing. Real histories of unredressed 
or unacknowledged victimization can contribute to both, as can mythic 
reconstructions, but either requires political orchestration to precipitate 
violence (or, for that matter, to pursue justice through nonviolent 
means). 
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